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Science, Eros and the Law: A Critique of
the Obscenity Commission Report t
Harry M. Clor*
In the battle over censorship of obscenity, passionate partisanship
has never been lacking-on either side of the issue. For decades, ultra-
moralists and ultra-libertarians have raged at each other, both claiming
a monopoly of righteousness or enlightenment. This warfare was sup-
posed to be de-escalated by the 640 page Report of the Commission on
Obscenity and Pornography.' The Report is supposed to undermine
the prejudices which have so long infected this subject by bringing to
bear upon it objective facts and solid evidence derived from systematic
empirical research.
But the battle continues. Indeed, it has been inflamed by the Report
which has itself become the object of passionate controversy and re-
criminations. Some moralists have accused the Commission of gross
immorality, while some libertarians have seized upon its findings as
a final solution so authoritative that rejection of it must imply, at least,
intellectual dishonesty. These responses are understandable in a con-
troversy as profoundly ideological and political (in the broadest sense
of the term) as this one. But the prevalence of such responses in our
public debate is unfortunate, for they obscure from public view the
underlying considerations-questions of political, ethical, cultural, and
even philosophic import, and currently vital questions concerning the
application of the social sciences to the problems of the law. It is
the endeavor of this essay to criticize the Report in such a way that
the underlying issues are not obscured.
The Commission consisted of eighteen members-seventeen ap-
pointed by President Johnson and one by President Nixon. Twelve
t This article originally appeared in somewhat different form as an appendix to
the author's essay Obscenity and Freedom of Expression, in CENSORSHIP AND FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION: ESSAYS ON OBscENrr AND THE LAW, Harry M. Clor, editor, Rand McNally,
1971. The original has been revised and expanded for publication in the Duquesne Law
Review.
* B.A., Lawrence College; Ph.D., University of Chicago; currently, Associate Professor,
Department of Political Science, Kenyon College; Director, Public Affairs Conference
Center, Kenyon College; OBscENrry AND PUBLIC MORALrrY (University of Chicago Press,
1969); Obscenity and Freedom of Expression, CENsORSHIP AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION:
ESSAYS ON OBSCENITY AND THE LAW, Harry M. Clor, editor, (Rand McNally, 1971).
1. The Report of the Commission on Obscenity and Pornography (1970) [hereinafter
cited as Commission].
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members of the Commission voted for its major recommendation "that
federal, state, and local legislation prohibiting the sale, exhibition, or
distribution of sexual materials to consenting adults should be re-
pealed." 2 Six members dissented. The Commission majority recom-
mended that obscenity statutes designed specifically to protect the
young should be retained but with an important proviso: "that only
pictorial material should fall within prohibitions upon sale or com-
mercial display to young persons." 3 Thus the legal restriction of obscene
books, pictorials, and motion pictures is to be totally abolished for
adults, and restriction of obscene books or other textual materials is
to be totally abolished for children.
These policy recommendations are based, essentially, on two prop-
ositions: (1) "Extensive empirical investigation, both by the Commis-
sion and by others, provides no evidence that exposure to or use of
explicit sexual materials play a significant role in the causation of
social or individual harms such as crime, delinquency, sexual or non-
sexual deviancy, or severe emotional disturbances,4 and (2) "Public
opinion in America does not support the imposition of legal prohibi-
tions upon the right of adults to read or see explicit sexual materials." 5
Most of the empirical investigations relied upon were those under-
taken specifically for the Commission during the two years of its life.
The investigations employed these research methods: surveys (using
questionnaires or interviews) in which various samples of people were
asked to report on their sexual behavior or attitudes and on the amount
of their exposure to erotic materials; comparison of groups of delin-
quents and sex offenders to non-delinquents and non-offenders with
regard to their exposure to pornography; controlled experiments in
which volunteers were exposed to a variety of erotic books, pictures,
and films and then tested for their responses; and statistical studies of
the incidence of sex crimes in the United States and Denmark during
the past decade when erotica has been widely available.
Interpreting the results of this research, the Commission drew the
following conclusions. Exposure to erotic materials produces psycho-
sexual stimulation in most people (females as well as males), but it
does not produce any significant changes in either sexual behavior or
moral attitudes. Experience with pornography, or erotica, is widespread
2. Id. at 51.
3. Id. at 58.
4. Id. at 52.
5. Id. at 53.
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among American youth, but there is no significant statistical difference
between juvenile delinquents and non-delinquents in this regard. Sex-
ual offenders have generally encountered erotica later in life than non-
offenders. In Copenhagen, reported sexual offenses have decreased since
the repeal of legal restrictions on obscenity. In the United States the
incidence of sex offenses has increased in the past ten years but not as
much as robbery and narcotics violations. There is evidence to suggest
that "explicit sexual materials" may be useful for purposes of sexual
education or entertainment and that repeated exposure to such mate-
rials results in satiation and loss of interest.
The validity, the meaning, and the general significance of these find-
ings are already subjects of considerable debate in the scholarly com-
munity. (To be distinguished from the public debate referred to above.)
The Report's conclusions about the harmlessness of obscenity have been
challenged on two different kinds of grounds. Some social scientists
criticize the Commission for inaccurate or ideologically biased inter-
pretation of its research findings; others deny that the type of research
employed can yield answers to the crucial questions about effects of
literature and the arts on human beings. A report filed by three dis-
senting Commissioners includes a detailed critical analysis by Professor
Victor B. Cline, a clinical psychologist. Quoting directly from many of
the Commission's empirical studies, Cline presents evidence contra-
dicting some of the Commission's interpretation and reporting of the
results. He asserts:
A number of the research studies upon which the report is based
suggest significant statistical relationships between pornography,
sexual deviancy, and promiscuity. Yet, some vital data suggesting
this linkage are omitted or "concealed." Findings from seriously
flawed research studies or findings which do not follow from the
data are sometimes presented as fact without mentioning their very
serious limitations.,
Other scholars have been critical of the Commission's exclusive reliance
upon statistical and "behavioral science" techniques of analysis.7 Since
fundamental issues are involved, this debate can be expected to continue
for a long time. When the ten volumes of Technical Reports (contain-
6. Id. at 390.
7. See Wilson, Violence, Pornography and Social Science, THE PUBLIC INTEREST, Win-
ter, 1971, at 45; Packer, The Pornography Caper, COMMENTARY, February, 1971, at 72;
and the comments of Sheldon and Eleanor Glueck, recognized authorities on juvenile
delinquency, Glueck, S. and E., Moving Towards Wholesale Permissiveness: Interview,
U.S. NEWS AND WORLD REPORT, January 25, 1971, at 68.
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ing detailed descriptions of all the research) are made available, it will
be easier to assess the allegations about concealed evidence and distor-
tion of findings. But on the basis of the Commission's long summary
of its research, we can identify some substantial defects or limitations.
The experimental studies did not (and could not) explore the long-
range effects of frequent exposure to the obscene. The Commission was
in existence for only two years, and less time than that was available for
the actual conduct of research. Typical of the Commission's studies
were those in which volunteers were shown two erotic films and asked
to fill out questionnaires about their sexual behavior prior to the
experiment and in the days or weeks following it. Most of the subjects
reported no changes in their sexual behavior, and the changes reported
were insubstantial. Other research involved exposure to obscene mate-
rials ninety minutes a day for three weeks or once a week for four
weeks. Before and after the exposure, subjects were given tests designed
to measure sexual attitudes. The investigation usually found that most
people's attitudes had not changed and that such changes as did occur
were insignificant. These results are not surprising. It would be more
surprising if an individual's patterns of sexual behavior could be
altered by a couple of erotic films or if basic attitudes would be revised
as a result of three weeks of experimental exposure to erotic materials.
Most thoughtful proponents of censorship are not really concerned
about such direct and immediate effects for which this research was
presumably testing.
The real issues concern the consequences of many years of indul-
gence in obscene literature and arts, or, more exactly, the consequences
of growing up in a community in which grossly obscene arts are highly
prevalent, readily accessible, and sanctioned by the law. Some advo-
cates of the legal control of obscenity argue that the ultimate evils of
widespread obscenity result from its long-range influences upon the
cultural environment of a people and, hence, upon mind and character.
It is observed that books, magazines, motion pictures, pictorial displays,
television, and advertising constitute a substantial part of the cultural
environment, having, over a period of time, cumulative effects upon
people's attitudes, values, and sensibilities. And if noble arts can pro-
mote humane sensibilities, then prurient arts, which degrade human
beings, can undermine humane sensibilities (particularly when ren-
dered acceptable by legal sanction).8
8. P. SoRoKiN, THE AMERICAN SEX REVOLUTION (1956); MEAD, Sex and Censorship in
Vol. 10: 63, 1971
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The Commission's work throws less light on these broad considera-
tions than its majority seems to believe. More light could possibly
result from studies covering much longer time periods. But even these
could not be expected to yield conclusive proof; findings would remain
problematic because of certain limitations inherent in an experimental-
science approach to the larger human and social questions.
Necessarily, all of the Commission's experimental studies were con-
ducted with volunteers, usually college students. We do not know if
the persons who choose to participate in such experiments are suffi-
ciently typical of the general population to warrant inferences from the
responses of the former to those of the latter. In addition, many of
these investigations were at least somewhat dependent upon the
subjects' own testimony (in interviews or questionnaires) about their
experiences with erotic literature or their sexual conduct-normal and
abnormal, marital or extra-marital. Some of the studies relied heavily
upon such "self-reporting" about intimate matters. While the Com-
mission made efforts to test the reliability of this information, there is
no way to be certain of its reliability. Further, because of public atti-
tudes (mistaken in the Commission's view) against exposing children
to pornography, there were no experiments involving children. Indeed,
there was little research of any kind involving them.
The Commission acknowledges the limitations referred to above
(although the acknowledgment does not appear to affect its confidence
in the conclusions drawn). But the Report does not reflect awareness
of certain other difficulties--difficulties concerning the effects of the
experimental situation itself upon participants. A laboratory situation
is a highly artificial one; it is not a "real life" situation. And it would
seem that the more rigorously systematic the experiment is, the more
artificial and unlike ordinary experience it is. How can the Commission
be as certain as it seems to be that responses of participants are not
decisively influenced by their awareness of the fact that they are being
tested for their responses, and, in general, by the circumstances of the
experiment?
For example, the Commission employed one study to test the theory
that the result of frequent indulgence in obscenity is not stimulation
Contemporary Society, NEw AMERICAN WRrnNG 7 (1953); Kristol, Pornography, Obscenity
and the Case for Censorship, New York Times (Magazine), March 28, 1971, at 24;
BERNS, Democracy, Censorship and the Arts, in CERSORSHIP AND FREmOM OF EXPRESSxON
(H. Clor ed. 1971); H. CLOR, OBSCENrrY AND PUBLIC MoaALrry (1969); van den Haag in
CENSORSHIP: FOR AND AGAINST 142 (H. Hart ed. 1971).
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and attraction but satiation and boredom. The subjects were twenty-
three university students each of whom spent ninety minutes a day for
three weeks, alone in a room with a variety of erotic materials. The
subject was observed through a one-way window and his psychosexual
stimulation was tested by several devices, including electrodes attached
to his penis, instruments in his ear, and a bellows around his chest.
Remarkably, the observations and tests indicated a declining interest
in the pornography (and in the study as well) as the experiment con-
tinued. The Report solemnly concludes that "the results obtained from
both physiological measures and reported levels of psychosexual stimu-
lation support the hypothesis that repeated exposure to sexual stimuli
results in decreased responsiveness." 9 Of course, such a conclusion need
not be drawn from this experiment-unless one is very anxious to draw
it. One might just as well conclude that arousal from pornography is
diminished by electrodes and systematic observation and that Science
anu ros do not mix.
The factors that shape the life experience, dispositions, and attitudes
of a human being are extremely complex, subtle, and interrelated. Is it
realistic to suppose that two discrete factors-amount of indulgence in
sexual literature and specific sexual behavior (or attitudes)--can be
separated out of this human mosaic and the relationship between them
precisely determined? And, if the ultimate question is not simply the
influence of the erotic books one has read upon his sexual conduct but
the influence of the cultural environment, public attitudes, and laws
upon his views or feelings about human life, then the methodological
problems become insuperable. If we cannot put a whole human life into
the laboratory and proceed rigorously to distinguish and measure its
parts, even less could we put a community's culture in the laboratory
and proceed analytically to measure its broad effects.
The Commission has attempted to deal with these problems (to the
extent that it is aware of them) by supplementing its experimental
research with statistical correlations between exposure to obscenity
and delinquency, sexual deviancy, moral attitudes, and moral character.
Hence the findings that juvenile delinquents have not, generally, con-
sumed more erotica than non-delinquents and that moral character is
statistically unrelated to amount of indulgence in erotica. Assuming
that the Commission has properly defined "delinquency" and cor-
rectly interpreted its data (arguable points), there remains the problem
9. Commission, supra at 181.
Vol. 10: 63, 1971
Commentaries
of the validity of the "self-reported" information upon which this
kind of study so heavily relies. And statistical correlations or non-corre-
lations do not definitively prove or disprove causal relationships.
Further, even if it has been shown that obscenity is not an important
"cause" of juvenile delinquency or sexual deviancy, this would not
establish its harmlessness to mind and character. The Commission,
however, believes that it has established that too-with the aid of a
psychological test designed to assess the elements of moral character.
In its sole study employing this test the Commission concludes that
"moral character was statistically unrelated to the amount of exposure
to erotica."' 10 Despite the importance of this one study for the Report's
conclusions, we are told remarkably little about it. We are told very
little about the criteria of good and bad character employed and noth-
ing about the techniques used to determine the character of the persons
studied. In the absence of further description of the study (and in view
of continuing disputes over the measurement and measurability of
such human qualities as "intelligence"), we may continue to doubt
that the subtleties of moral character are measurable by psychological
tests and questionnaires.
Thus there are good reasons for believing that the great questions of
cause and effect in human affairs will not be finally resolved for us
with scientific certitude. Whatever contribution "behavioral research"
may make to our understanding, the causes of far-reaching social
movements and profound moral consequences (the causes of "the
sexual revolution," for example) will always be sufficiently intricate
and ambiguous to allow for differences of interpretation. As James Q.
Wilson has observed: "The irony is that social science may be weakest
in detecting the broadest and most fundamental changes in human
values, precisely because they are broad and fundamental.""
If it is illusory to believe that the most fundamental changes in
human values can be conclusively explained by scientific data, it is
equally illusory to believe that they can be studied wholly in that spirit
of pure analytic detachment which prevails, for example, in a physics
laboratory. Where issues are both intractible and controversial, and
where plausible alternative viewpoints are always possible, our inter-
pretations are necessarily subject to the influence of ideological or
philosophic predispositions. It would be difficult to argue that, in
10. Id. at 202.
11. Wilson, supra at 58.
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interpreting and organizing its data, the Commission has been wholly
uninfluenced by ideology. Throughout the Report one finds discrep-
ancies or ambiguities in the facts presented and conclusions drawn
from them. And where alternative interpretations of data are possible,
the Report unfailingly chooses the libertarian one; that is, an interpre-
tation in accord with the libertarian view of the controversy over
obscenity censorship. The following are just three examples.
The Commission finds that there has been a decline in the number
of reported rapes in Copenhagen during the period in which pornogra-
phy has been widely available. 12 (In his dissenting analysis Professor
Cline presents rape statistics which challenge this finding; statistics
derived from the same research that the Commission used. 13) The
implication in the Commission's report of the Denmark studies is that
pornography has no causal connection with sex crimes or that its effect
is to reduce sex crimes. But, if this statistical approach is appropriate,
the data about the United States seem to point in the opposite direc-
tion. The Commission grants that in the United States "both the
availability of erotic material and the incidence of sex offenses in-
creased over the past decade,' '1 4 although the increase in certain non-
sex offenses has been greater. The figures show a 50% increase in adult
arrests for forcible rape and 60% for commercialized vice.'5 But the
Commission is not impressed with the significance of this finding. We
are told: "If the heightened availability of erotica were directly related
to the incidence of sex offenses, one would have expected an increase of
much greater magnitude than the available figures indicate."' 6
In the "satiation" study discussed above, the Commission claims to
have discovered evidence to support the thesis that regular exposure to
obscenity results in loss of interest. But other research conducted for
the Commission has produced evidence clearly to the contrary. Studies
of the patrons of adult bookstores and movie theaters indicate that
large numbers of people patronize these establishments quite regularly
(several times a week or more). And the Report itself states that "some-
where around one-fifth to one-quarter of the male population in the
United States has somewhat regular experience with sexual materials
as explicit as intercourse."'17 These studies, of course, were not testing
12. Commission, supra at 230-32.
13. Id. at 398-400.
14. Id. at 227.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 229.
17. Id. at 122.
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for "satiation"; they were conducted for other purposes. But nowhere
does the Report call the reader's attention to the fact that it contains
evidence sharply contrary to its conclusions about satiation and bore-
dom.
As a result of its public opinion survey, the Commission trium-
phantly reports that 61%/ of American adults "believe 'that sexual
materials provide information about sex.' "18 This point is presum-
ably addressed to the question of "redeeming social importance." In
the places where this result is reported, we are not told what the
respondents mean by "information" or how they evaluate that "in-
formation." But elsewhere in the Report (as part of an argument that
good "sex education" is preferable to censorship), the Commission finds
that "in the opinion of most adults, especially most professional people,
learning about sexuality.., from pornographic or explicit sexual mate-
rials, may lead to misconceptions, myths, and distortions and is not the
preferred or ideal way to learn about sex."'19 Now what, exactly, is it
that most American adults believe about the informational value of
pornography?
This leads me to the broader question about public attitudes toward
censorship of obscenity. The Commission believes it has found that the
majority of Americans do not support any legal restrictions on the
right of adults to read or view "explicit sexual materials." Thus far, this
is the only public opinion research to have produced that result. All
such research that I know of has produced quite different results. For
example, a recent Gallup poll found that 85% of the adult population
"favor stricter laws on pornography"20 and a Harris poll has found
that 76%/ "want pornographic literature outlawed" and 72%o believe
"smut is taking the beauty out of sex."2'
It is not easy to assess the evidence that the Commission provides in
support of its conclusions about public opinion. The evidence is not
presented in a very coherent manner. Diverse statistical figures are
scattered throughout the Report, with apparent discrepancies between
some of the "findings" and others and no explanation of the discrep-
ancies. Frequently the reader is not told what was the precise question
put to respondents in the attitude surveys. Of course, in any public
opinion poll the exact wording of the question is extremely important.
18. Id. at 157, 356.
19. Id. at 270.
20. THE GALLuP OPINION INDEX, No. 49, July, 1969.
21. THE HARRis INDEX TO PUBXC OPINION, 1969.
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(It would make some difference, for example, whether people are
asked, "Do you believe that some kinds of pornography should be to-
tally outlawed?" or, "Do you believe that the law should prevent adults
from viewing erotic materials that they wish to view?" The latter ques-
tion stresses the coercive aspects of obscenity law and is likely to tap
the libertarian dispositions of respondents. The former question is
more likely to tap their "moralistic" dispositions.) And finally, it seems
that some of the results are not presented in the majority Report at
all.
At one point in the Report it is revealed that "68% of the sample
felt that 'some people should not be allowed to read or see some' sexual
materials," but that "51% of the population would be inclined to sanc-
tion availability of erotic materials if it were clearly demonstrated that
such materials had no harmful effects on the user."'22 Is this the crucial
evidence on the basis of which the Commission has drawn its conclu-
sions? We do not know; we are not told just what body of survey evi-
dence has led the Commission to its confident assertions about public
opinion. But it might be noted that 51% is not a very large majority
willing to abandon all censorship (assuming that is what they would
be willing to do) "if it were clearly demonstrated" that pornography
is harmless. No doubt the Commission believes that it has made the
clear demonstration. But, evidently, the respondents were not asked
what they would consider proof of the harmlessness of obscenity.
Elsewhere in the Report we are told that "indeed, a majority of
American adults (almost 60%) believe that adults should be allowed
to read or see any explicit sexual materials they want to,"23 but that only
"29% believed it all right to admit adults to movies showing sex ac-
tivities which include whips, belts, or spankings." 24 Apart from the
discrepancy (which the Report attempts to explain away), what of the
ambiguity and possible predisposition of the response by the language
"allowed to read or see?" At any rate, the responses to that question
appear to conflict with responses to other questions in the same survey.
Professor Cline (but not the majority Report) presents this finding:
"(Abelson, 1970) 88% of a national sample would prohibit sex scenes
in movies that were put in for entertainment; but only 50% say that
no one should be admitted to movies depicting sexual intercourse." 25
22. Commission, supra at 157.
23. Id. at 352.
24. Id. at 353.
25. Id. at 402.
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What are we to make of all this?. Perhaps the ten volumes of Tech-
nical Reports will resolve it all, but this is much to be doubted. What
is much less to be doubted is that libertarian ideology has presided
over the doings of the Obscenity Commission. Among the libertarian
opinions apparently held by the majority of Commissioners are these:
that precious freedoms would be endangered by laws restricting chil-
dren's access to textual pornography; that "pornography is in the eye
of the beholder"; that literature and the arts are merely "entertain-
ment" or "amusement": and that the distinction between great litera-
ture (or "fine art") and pornography is reducible to the distinction
between some people's amusements and other people's amusements. Let
us briefly examine the Commission's case for these propositions.
With regard to the exclusion of all textual materials from obscenity
laws protecting children, the following is the Commission's argument
in its entirety:
An attempt to define prohibited textual materials for young per-
sons with the same degree of specificity as pictorial materials would,
the Commission believes, not be advisable. Many worthwhile tex-
tual works, containing considerable value for young persons, treat
sex in an explicit manner and are presently available to young
persons. There appears to be no satisfactory way to distinguish,
through a workable legal definition, between these works and those
which may be deemed inappropriate by some persons for commer-
cial distribution to young persons. As a result, the inclusion of tex-
tual material within juvenile legislative prohibitions would pose
considerable risks for dealers and distributors in determining what
books might legally be sold or displayed to young persons and
would thus inhibit the entire distribution of verbal materials by
those dealers who do not wish to expose themselves to such risks.
The speculative risk of harm to juveniles from some textual mate-
rial does not justify these dangers.26
Surely the case for legalizing commercial distribution of sado-mas-
ochistic novelettes to children requires more rational support than this.
The gist of this argument is that it is more difficult to formulate a pre-
cise definition of "obscenity" for writings than for pictures, therefore,
whatever the legal definition of obscenity for children, booksellers would
be in doubt about some materials and might thus restrict themselves
from selling to children some sexual novels that the law does not re-
strict. Of course, no legal definition of what is obscene for children
26. Id. at 58.
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could be absolutely precise, relieving booksellers of all doubt and all
responsibility for exercising due care. But this is a great "danger" only
from an ultra-libertarian point of view which is unwilling to tolerate
even such restraints as would require a bookseller to think twice (and
perhaps run some risk) in purveying "borderline" sexual materials to
children. It is quite possible for legislators to write a statute and courts
to interpret it in such a way that Madame Bovary, or Lady Chatterley's
Lover, is distinguishable from a sado-masochistic paperback and other
forms of sheer pornography. And, regarding the children's freedom to
read, parents would remain at liberty to give their children Madame
Bovary, Lady Chatterley, and hard-core pornography. But this does not
seem to be enough freedom to satisfy the authors of the Report.27
With respect to the reality of the obscene in human affairs, the Com-
mission majority has this to say:
The proposition that obscenity or pornography is "in the eye of
the beholder" is trite, but nonetheless true .... Although virtually
all societies have formulated definitions of "obscene" or "porno-
graphic" representations, words, and acts, there is no universally
defined standard with respect to what is obscene.28
It might be pointed out that there is not universal agreement on the
definitions of good and bad moral character, beauty and ugliness, hu-
maneness and barbarism, freedom and oppression. But it hardly fol-
lows that all of these qualities are, therefore, wholly in the eye of the
beholder (which is to say wholly subjective phenomena, having no ob-
jective reality). The Commission does not explore the implications of
its subjectivism, or relativism, nor does it stop to consider why virtually
all societies have formulated conceptions of the obscene and whether
these various and differing conceptions might have something in com-
mon.
The authors of the Report have carried their relativism to sufficient
lengths as to undermine (if not obliterate) the distinction between great
works of art and amusement, and between serious literature and por-
nography. In the context of an argument about "redeeming social
value," the Commission says:
27. It would appear that the authors of the Report have overruled Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968). In that case, the Supreme Court upheld state restriction of
children's access to materials (textual as well as pictorial) which would not be "obscene"
for adults. And the Court held that the New York statute in question was neither viola-
tive of children's first amendment rights nor unduly vague.
28. Commission, supra at 210.
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If... entertainment or amusement value is not social value then
works of fine art would not have the protection afforded works of
historical or philosophic interest-an unhappy result. In practice,
works of fine art appear to be recognized as bearing social value.
As a result, the test probably is applied to discriminate in an unjus-
tifiable way against "low brow" amusements (as compared with
"fine" art) although the functions served by each kind of art may
be basically the same.29
Now, I will be told that this passage does not quite say categorically
that Shakespeare, James Joyce, and D. H. Lawrence are nothing more
than amusement and that all amusements are ethically and aesthetically
equal. But surely that is the implication of the passage (an implication
unmodified by anything else in the Report), and it must be if the pas-
sage is going to make its legal point. Is it an arbitrary discrimination,
then, to distinguish between Romeo and Juliet and an exploitation film
(sadistic, bestial, or "normal")? Shall all such aesthetic distinctions be
sacrificed to the principle that one man's amusement is as worthy as
another's? At any rate, those who devote their lives to literature and
the arts might well be less than inspired by these arguments on behalf
of freedom of expression.
The three ideological premises or assumptions just considered are
not necessarily dead wrong. Their wrongness (or the degree of their
wrongness) is not my main concern here. My main concern is with
the paucity of argument present in the Report on their behalf. On
my reading of the Report, these premises (and others like them) have
had considerable influence on the character of its inquiry: they have
influenced the kinds of questions asked, the kinds of evidence deemed
relevant, and the kinds of answers deemed adequate. Yet they are as-
serted in almost dogmatic fashion with scarcely any supporting argu-
ment-and certainly with no attention to the broad ethical and
philosophic considerations involved. This is not an accident. It is, I
think, inherent in the Commission's methodological posture toward
its subject matter. When one believes that the important consider-
ations can be resolved by statistical devices and laboratory technology,
then one is bound to slight the less tangible (but more comprehensive)
ethical and philosophical dimensions of the subject. Indeed, since
these dimensions are not amenable to technological analysis, one is
free to adopt more-or-less dogmatic assumptions about them. It is in
29. Id. at 360.
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this manner that the Commission has accomplished not an enlarge-
ment (as it believes) but a remarkable constriction of the inquiry and
debate on this subject.30
The fact that ideology has presided over the doings of this particular
national Commission is not the most important fact. The most impor-
tant consideration is what the Commission's work has to tell us about
the limitations of behavioral social science as a resolver of controversial
questions in public policy. It will be unfortunate if people conclude
that the obscenity problem has now been resolved because now, at last,
we have the scientific facts. It would be even more unfortunate if
people accept the implicit claims that the Commission has made for
the primacy of its behavioralist methodology over other ways of
thinking about social problems and legal principles.
I find nothing in the Commission's work that requires abandonment
of the proposition I asserted several years ago in Obscenity and Public
Morality:
Such effects as these [effects of the cultural environment upon the
quality of life] are . . . most difficult to measure, and surely they
cannot be predicted with scientific accuracy. It is with regard to
this kind of cause-and-effect relationship that the limits of scienti-
fic and specialized expertise becomes most evident. It cannot be
demonstrated by any kind of experimentation exactly in what way
or to what extent good and bad literature effect the moral and
intellectual life of a community. When this kind of problem is
reached, science tends to give way to social philosophy and to sober
reflection upon common experience.3'
There are opposing social philosophies and different ways of inter-
preting common experience, and these are the crucial battlegrounds.
30. I will be told that this analysis slights the Commission's emphasis upon the pro-
motion of "healthy sexual attitudes" by means of "sex education" as a positive approach
to whatever problems may be caused by pornography. Unfortunately, although the Re-
port devotes some thirty-five pages to the subject, it fails to define or describe what it
really means by "healthy sexual attitudes." And it fails to tell us, except in vague gener-
alities, what is appropriate sex education. At some points in the Report it is suggested
that the crux of sex education is provision of "sex information" (Commission supra at
47-49) and elsewhere it is suggested that such information might well be provided by
pornography. Commission, supra at 277-279. What is the primary aim of sex education: to
provide information? to relax inhibitions? to promote a connection between sexuality and
love or affection? Nowhere does the Report squarely confront this basic question of ends;
to the extent that it touches upon this at all, its discussions of it is vague, ambiguous, or
highly abstract. One is forced to conclude that there are matters to be determined by the
experts-yet another example of the Report's pervasively technocratic approach to vital
and intimate human concerns.
31. Clor, supra at 172.
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